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Institutional systems differ significantly in their capacity to absorb and process conflict. In some countries, for 
example Argentina, almost every contentious issue finds thousands of people on the Plaza de Mayo, tractors 
blocking roads, and pickets cutting a bridge in Neuquén. Yet in other countries, say Costa Rica, almost all conflicts 
are disciplined by political parties and processed through the Congress, the Presidency, or the Courts. 
Adam Przeworski  
“Representative Institutions, Political Conflicts, and Public Policies”.   




1.  Introduction 
 
Most countries in Latin America democratized in the 1980s.  After a few decades of 
uninterrupted democratic rule, many of them share an intermediate level of democratic maturity 
and of institutional development. Yet, the study of policymaking in contemporary Latin America 
reveals important variation across countries and over time in the strength, relevance, and 
characteristics of specific institutions such as the congress, the judiciary, or the political party 
system.  Chile, for instance, is a country in which policies are debated extensively with rich input 
from think tanks affiliated with political parties. Policy bargaining in Chile takes place both 
within parties belonging to the government coalition and between these parties and those of the 
opposition in Congress. After agreements have been reached, policies are implemented by a 
technically competent bureaucracy and enforced by an independent judiciary.   
Conditions could hardly be more different in Chile’s neighbor across the Andes. While 
Argentina shares many cultural and structural similarities with Chile, its political institutions 
such as Congress, the party system, the bureaucracy and the judiciary are fairly weak, even by 
regional standards. Argentine presidents frequently attempt to push their agendas with little 
consultation and consensus, bypassing and weakening institutions whenever possible or 
convenient.
2  
                                                           
2 See Aninat et al. (2008 and 2009) on Chile, and Spiller and Tommasi (2007 and 2008) and Urbiztondo et al. (2009) 
on Argentina. Broader contrasts on the strength of institutions and institutionalization of policymaking are provided 
in a set of comparative cases in Stein et al (2008). Saiegh (2009) studies the degree of institutionalization and 
strength of Congress as a policymaking arena across 18 Latin American countries, ranking the Chilean legislature 
among the top three in all measures, and the Argentine legislature among the bottom three in all measures.  Jones 
(2009) analyzes political party systems and classifies those same 18 countries in seven groups as a function of a 
number of characteristics. Chile belongs (with Uruguay) to group 1, that of the most programmatic party systems; 
Argentina belongs to group 7, a group of countries in which “the principal goal of politicians is to continue to obtain 
the resources needed to maintain the clientelistic system upon which their support is based. Whether policy is ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ from a technocratic perspective is less important than whether or not the policy will increase or decrease the 
amount of resources at the politician’s disposal …” (p. 57).  Magaldi de Sousa (2008) studies the role of the 
Judiciary in policymaking across Latin American countries: Chile appears 3
rd of 18 countries (after Uruguay and 
Costa Rica) in its judicial independence, while Argentina ranks 13
th of 18.   7
Nonetheless, democracy offers a variety of channels and instruments for citizens to 
participate in the political process.  Through voting, one of the most basic democratic tools, 
citizens select their representatives to public office and convey their policy preferences. In 
addition to such conventional channels, citizens have other means to affect political decisions at 
their disposal. Protests and demonstrations, ranging from simple marches to road blockades and 
even violence, are some prominent examples. While most countries experience such phenomena 
only rarely, others do so as almost as a matter of course. he time.   
In Latin America protests and other contentious strategies were common and played an 
important role during democratization, declining somewhat afterwards (Hipsher, 1996; Eckstein 
and Garretón Merino, 2001). The last decade, however, has witnessed a resurgence of overall 
protest activity, but to varying degrees of intensity and political relevance across countries. In 
countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, street protests have become a very 
salient and meaningful way to achieve certain political objectives and to express policy demands.  
In other cases, like Chile and Brazil, protests are more sporadic and far less relevant to 
policymaking in general.
3  
The question we address is this paper is that of the relationship between individual 
choices of means to affect political decisions and the quality of political institutions. The very 
day we first wrote this paragraph the main editorial and the cover page of the leading newspaper 
in Argentina were devoted to several protests occurring around the country. These included the 
following: a protest of families and friends of victims of a fire in a Buenos Aires nightclub—who 
staged violent acts in front of the courts where those allegedly responsible for the fire were being 
acquitted; a clash between the inhabitants of a shantytown and police forces on account of the 
death of a 17-year-old girl; and agricultural producers trying to reach the national Congress 
building, surrounded by the police, where legislators were voting to extend special powers to the 
executive that would eventually lead to higher taxes on agricultural exports. The editorial page of 
the newspaper El Clarín reflected on these events as follows:  
 
                                                           
3 Case studies of policymaking in Argentina (Urbiztondo et al., 2009), Bolivia (Jemio, Candia and Evio, 2009) and 
Ecuador (Mejía Acosta et al., 2008) reveal an important role of street protests in the making of policy in those 
countries. This contrasts with the account of policymaking in places like Chile (Aninat et al., 2008 and 2009) or 
Brazil (Alston et al., 2008 and 2009) where protests seem to be far less general and less influential in the making of 
policy.   8
“Institutionalization is a pending chapter in Argentine society.  It reveals, among 
other things, the deep mistrust in judicial decisions, in security forces, and in 
political representation, and the exasperated reactions such feelings provoke.  This 
permanent exasperation is creating a negative culture of excesses and 
recklessness.  Institutional mistrust and direct violence are negative forces to any 
society” (Kirschbaum, 2009; authors’ translation).  
 
Thus protests, which are becoming an important mechanism for expressing preferences and 
attempting to change political outcomes in several Latin American countries, might be largely 
driven by the low credibility of the political institutions in place. 
We argue in this paper that, in democracies, the workings of formal political institutions 
and the use of violent means of expressing political demands are related phenomena. As the 
opening quotation by Adam Przeworski suggests, countries vary substantially in the degree to 
which policy is made mainly through deliberation and bargaining in institutionalized arenas, or 
by using alternative means such as violence. In some countries, policymaking through 
formalized arenas such as congress is central. In such cases the political process is approximated 
reasonably well by standard models of elections and bargaining that take place within formal 
political institutions. In other cases, however, the making of policy is far less orderly, involving a 
considerable amount of action taken outside formal institutions. As an illustration, Figure 1 
shows the relationship between a measure of the quality of political institutions—considering  
Congress, Courts, political parties and the bureaucracy (explained in detail below)—and a widely 
utilized measure of political unrest (strikes, riots, and demonstrations; see for instance 
Przeworski, 2009), across 20 Latin American countries.   9
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We observe a clear negative relationship between the quality of political institutions and 
the extent of political unrest. Unconventional forms of political participation tend to be chosen 
where institutions are of lower quality. Indeed, our claim is that the strength and relevance of 
formal political institutions are key determinants of the individual choice of channels of political 
participation. When institutions are strong, actors are more likely to participate through 
institutionalized arenas. When they are weak, however, protests and other unconventional means 
of participation become more appealing. 
In the next section we summarize the theoretical framework we have developed to 
explore these issues.
4 We extend mainstream models of policymaking within formal 
institutions—dominant in the international literature
5—to incorporate the possible use of 
alternative political technologies such as protests. The models generate a number of results 
relating individual decisions to the degree of institutionalization of the policymaking process. 
We explore some of these results empirically in this paper by combining country-level measures 
                                                           
4 The framework draws from models developed in previous and ongoing work: Scartascini and Tommasi (2009), 
Trucco (2009), and Scartascini, Trucco and Tommasi (2009). 
5 Such as those summarized in the well known textbook of Persson and Tabellini (2000).   10
of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in 17 Latin 
American countries.  
In anticipation of our results, we find evidence that weaker political institutions are 
associated with a higher propensity to use alternative means for expressing preferences, that is, to 
protest.  We also find interesting interactions between country-level institutional strength and 
some individual-level determinants of participation in protests.  For instance, ideological 
extremism is a significant determinant of protest participation in countries with stronger 
institutions (confirming results from studies of protests in developed countries), while it is not 
significant in countries with weaker institutions.  Similarly, those who believe that political 
parties represent their constituencies well are less likely to participate in protest in countries 
where institutions are relatively strong; in contrast, in countries with weak institutions, even 
those (few) who believe that parties represent their constituencies well are more likely to engage 
in protests. We discuss these findings in light of our theoretical framework. 
 
2.  Analytical Framework: Institutions and Alternative Political Technologies 
 
Political actors, whether groups or individuals, face various alternatives when deciding whether 
and how to engage in the collective processes leading to public decisions.  One set of alternatives 
that we call “the institutionalized road” includes, among other things, voting in elections, 
designing platforms, forming political parties, bargaining in Congress, and funding political 
parties and think tanks.  A different set of alternatives, which we have dubbed alternative 
political technologies—or APTs for short (Scartascini and Tommasi, 2009)—include actions 
such as bribing politicians, blocking roads, burning tires, picketing, and threatening violent 
action.   
These two sets of actions are commonly studied in isolation. While we argue in this paper 
that in countries where either one prevails the other tends to be rare, combining both in a more 
general framework can provide important insights on the conditions leading to each of these 
distinct equilibria. In previous and ongoing work, 
 we have developed models where individuals 
and groups are given the option to affect political decisions through two distinct arenas: an 
institutionalized one, similar to those modeled in the mainstream literature on policymaking   11
within formal institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), and an alternative arena characterized 
by unconventional forms of participation such as road blockades.
6  
The basic framework we employ can be described as follows. Citizens have the option to 
pursue their preferred policy outcomes through representatives in congress or directly through 
the threat of imposing costs on society, such as road blockades. We explore individual choices 
under two distinct assumptions about the workings of Congress. In the first case, we assume all 
citizens have equal chances of getting their preferred outcomes through that political institution. 
In the second, we assume that some citizens are better able to secure their preferred outcomes 
through Congress than others.  
In the first case, the non-institutionalized equilibrium occurs only if enough players 
choose that route. No one single player, however, has a higher (or lower) incentive to do so. 
Overcoming collective action problems and the ability to pose a credible threat to the authorities 
are important factors determining the use of APTs in such cases. The more interesting and 
probably more realistic case, however, occurs when we introduce inequalities in representation. 
Under such circumstances some players have a stronger incentive to engage in more direct forms 
of participation than others. Actors who have little or no chance of having their interests taken 
into account in the formal decision-making process are more likely to take the streets. 
Thus the choice of arena by players depends on both individual (e.g., predisposition to 
participate in protests and the sense of having ones’ interests represented) and contextual factors 
(e.g., how well institutions work), besides the choices of the other players, as reflected in the 
equilibrium solution to the game.   
Over time, these choices can lead countries to two types of equilibria. In an environment 
where the predominant form of political participation is the “institutionalized” one, actors are 
much more likely to invest in improving their individual and collective capacities in that arena.
7  
The opposite would be likely in environments where decisions are heavily influenced by 
unconventional or even violent activities. Investing in technologies that increase strength and 
capabilities in the institutionalized game (such as acquiring policy expertise) or in technologies 
                                                           
6 In Scartascini and Tommasi (2009) the formal arena is a legislative bargaining model a la Baron-Ferejohn (1989), 
and in Scartascini, Trucco and Tommasi (2009b) the formal arena is a decision making mechanism leading to 
median-voter outcomes. In Trucco (2009) and Scartascini, Trucco and Tommasi (2009a) the set of alternative 
political technologies includes both street protests (for everybody) and the possibility of bribing your way towards 
better outcomes from formal political decisions (for a lucky few).  See those papers for references to the rich 
literature we build on. 
7 On institutions as investments, see Bates (1997).   12
that increase strength and capabilities in the street (such as buying weapons or collecting old 
rubber tires to burn on the streets) would clearly have an impact on the extent of productivity and 
strength of formal institutions, as well as on the quality of the policy output.
8 
Legislatures are critical institutions in the effective functioning of a democratic system 
and the policymaking process.  The extent and nature of the role played by legislatures vary 
greatly from country to country. It is fairly common in the literature to model legislatures and 
their functioning based on the features of the United States Congress.  It is usually characterized 
by representatives serving multiple terms in office, who have an incentive to acquire expertise in 
certain policy areas through long-term assignments to specific policy committees. The U.S. 
Congress plays an active role in policymaking and in the oversight of the public bureaucracy, 
and it is the focus of and the main entry point for the political influence of interest groups.
9  
None of these features, however, applies to several Latin American congresses. This is 
particularly true in the case of Argentina, despite the fact that the constitutional structure of both 
countries displays strong similarities (Jones et al., 2002). That is, even if on paper the Argentine 
and American Congresses look similar, in practice they are far apart. In contrast to the case of 
Argentina, however, the Chilean legislature plays a much more important role in the country’s 
policymaking process. Thus the region displays a certain degree of cross-country variation that 
we explore in the empirical exercises.  Note that these differences among countries are 
associated with various measures of legislators’ and legislatures’ capabilities that have a clear 
investment component.  These include the number of terms commonly served by legislators, 
their educational attainment and levels of policy expertise, the use and organization of special 
policy committees, and the resources available for policy analysis.  All of these factors are likely 
to influence the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by this institution among the public and the 
relevance of serving as a legislator to the careers of politicians.
10 
                                                           
8 There are various reasons why more institutionalized collective decision making arenas will lead to better policies 
and better outcomes, such as providing a better structure for exchange of information and for the agreement and 
enforcement of intertemporal cooperation. According to Pierson (2004: 107) “political institutions can serve to 
coordinate the behavior and expectations of decentralized actors (Carey, 2000) and to facilitate bargaining by 
creating monitoring bodies, issue linkages, and mechanisms for making credible commitments (Keohane, 1984; 
Weingast, 2002).”  Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2009) show that more institutionalized policymaking 
environments lead to policies that are more stable, (yet) more adaptable to changing circumstances, more 
coordinated and coherent, and better implemented. 
9 See for instance Weingast and Marshall (1988), Shepsle and Weingast (1995), Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 
(2005), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and references there. 
10 See Jones et al. (2002), Spiller and Tommasi (2008), Aninat et al. (2008), and Tommasi (2008) for comparisons 
between Argentina and Chile. Saiegh (2009) and Stein and Tommasi (2007) provide wider comparisons, showing a   13
As mentioned earlier, in this paper we focus the empirical analysis on one APT of great 
saliency in several Latin American countries: street protests. Following our framework, we 
expect to find a number of empirical connections between the characteristics of institutions such 
as Congress and the political party system and the decision of political actors to take part in 
protests. First, we expect a negative correlation between institutional strength and the individual 
propensity to use alternative political technologies such as protests. Protest should be more 
prevalent under weaker institutions, where, either because of imperfect representation or other 
deficiencies, individuals do not expect to obtain their desired political goals through the regular 
institutional means. At the individual level we would expect those for whom the collective action 
costs of participation are lower and the expected benefits of more direct means of political action 
are higher to be more likely to engage in protest. We rely on the extensive literature on protest 
participation to derive measures that capture these factors. In addition to these direct effects of 
institutional strength and individual level features resulting from our basic framework, we 
explore some extensions that reveal important interactions between the two.  
 
2.1 Political Parties, Representation, and Protest 
 
Democracies are representative governments. The link between citizens’ interests and the 
outcomes of the policy-making process is mediated primarily through parties. The way in which 
they fulfill this role can have an important impact on individuals’ decision to protest.  Parties are 
not limited to representing the preferences of their constituencies through institutionalized 
means, such as via their representatives in congress. Parties and their members might also opt to 
voice preferences through the streets if representation through institutionalized channels is 
hindered by weak institutions.  
Thus parties, as organized groups of individuals, also have two types of mechanisms to 
attempt to achieve their constituents’ goals. They can place their bets in the institutionalized 
channels of election, legislative debate, and technical discussions, or they can use their 
organizational capabilities to mobilize collective action in the streets.  When political decisions 
are made mainly through a well-functioning institutionalized process, protests are likely to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strong correlation of such objective indicators of Congress capabilities with assessments about the importance of 
Congress in policymaking across 18 Latin American countries. Such analyses constitute the background for the 
empirical measures of institutional strength we use in this paper.  Similar analyses and data building efforts to those 
focused on Congress have been performed for the Judiciary (IDB, 2005; Magaldi de Sousa, 2008), political party 
systems (IDB, 2005; Jones, 2009), and bureaucracies (IDB 2005, Zuvanic and Iacoviello, 2009).   14
a lower impact on decisions and the former strategy might prevail. When, on the other hand, 
institutions are weaker, protest can be an effective way to affect decisions and the latter strategy 
more profitable.
11 
These parties’ strategies will have implications for the relationship between beliefs about 
the quality of representation and the individual propensity to participate in protests. If 
representation is achieved primarily through formal channels, citizens feeling represented by 
their parties would be less likely to protest. If, on the other hand, parties represent their 
constituencies’ interests primarily through direct means, such as protest, then those feeling 
represented would be more likely to protest. 
 
2.2 Ideological Extremism 
 
Ideological inclination is an important factor in accounting for engagement in protests. The 
earlier literature focusing on the developed democracies has placed particular emphasis on left- 
leaning ideology given its assumed ties to unions and other important protest-leading 
organizations.
12  
More recently, studies have argued that extremists in general, either at the left or at the 
right, are more “politically committed” and therefore more likely to engage in direct action 
(Jenkings et al, 1995). Indeed, Opp et al (1995) “supporting a variant of the “extremism” 
hypothesis […] find that rightists are as likely to protest as leftists in Israel and Peru, while the 
middle-of-the-roaders remain on the sidelines.”  
The recent experiences of countries such as Argentina (Przeworski, 2009) and Bolivia 
(Jemio, Candia and Evia et al., 2009; and Evia et al., 2008), where depending on the issue 
“almost everybody” seems to be willing to take the streets, suggest that the fact that people with 
extreme ideologies are more likely to engage in protests might be conditional on the strength of 
institutions. 
Using median voter logic can shed some light on those findings. According to the median 
voter theorem, voters situated at each of the extremes of the ideological scale would be equally 
                                                           
11  This relates to well know arguments in the democratization literature. Parties that lose an election can accept their 
short-term fate gracefully and invest in doing better in the electoral and coalitional arena next time, or they can use 
violence in an attempt to change things.  (See for instance Przeworski, 2005, Benhabib and Prszeworski, 2006, and 
Wanchtekon, 2000). 
12 We do not find evidence that people to the left of the median ideological placement are more likely to protest than 
those to the right in our Latin American sample.   15
unlikely to have their interests represented through formal channels, leading to a greater 
propensity to voice their interests in more direct ways.  That inference, however, holds under the 
assumption that institutions are fully functioning.  Where institutions are weaker, there is no 
reason to expect that “middle-of-the-roaders” will have their preferences reflected in the political 
outcomes either, and shortcomings in the workings of institutions can prompt them to take to the 
street as well.  If that is the case, we should observe no significant differences in the propensity 
to protest between extremists and moderates in countries with weaker institutions.
13 
 
3.  Protests in Latin America:  Empirical Analysis 
 
Protests involve varying numbers of participants in Latin America, as shown in Figure 2. In 
some cases protests impact policy decisions in important ways. In Bolivia, for example, teachers 
and police officers obtained substantial raises and benefits increases after they took their claims 
to the streets.
14 Likewise, a very influential protest that opposed the attempt of the government of 
Bolivia to change the tax system ended with the defeat of that proposal and ultimately shortened 
the administration of President Sánchez de Lozada.
15 Three other presidents in the region were 
similarly forced to step down as a result of popular protests just a few years apart (Mihaly, 
2006).
16 Protests by the rural sector in Argentina forced Congress to decide against a proposal by 
the executive to raise taxes on agricultural exports and ignited a political conflict that has 
weakened the popularity and power of the Kirchner administration.
17 
In other cases, however, protest is much more sporadic and has rather limited impact on 
major decisions. The question we explore in this section is under what circumstances citizens 
will have an incentive to join such forms of political participation. The broader literature on 
protest participation has found that some individuals are more likely to protest than others, based 
                                                           
13 Scartascini, Tommasi, and Trucco (2009b) formalize that result. Following the logic that the strength of 
institutions is in itself endogenous to the venue choices of political actors, they find the presence of multiple 
equilibria, inducing a positive correlation between institutional strength and the degree of ideological distance 
between protesters and the median voter. 
14 Scartascini and Stein (2003) present the impact of these mobilizations in the fiscal stance of the country. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the budget underwent substantial changes over the course of the year according to the 
show of strength of different actors in the streets of La Paz.   
15 “El 17 de octubre de 2003, las protestas populares masivas forzaron al presidente boliviano, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Losada, a la renuncia de su cargo luego de apenas 14 meses de un mandato proyectado a cinco años.” (Mihaly, 
2006: 95) 
16 The other presidents were Raul Cubas in Paraguay (1999), Mahuad in Ecuador (2000) and De la Rúa in Argentina 
(2001). 
17 A chronology of events can be followed in http://www.clarin.com/diario/2008/07/21/elpais/p-01719603.htm   16
on personal traits and predispositions. This accounts for some of the variation in protest 
participation within countries. As is clear from Figure 2, however, countries differ considerably 
in the number of citizens drawn to the streets, and individual characteristics alone cannot 
reasonably account for that difference. Our claim is that, in addition to such basic personal 
characteristics, there exists a relevant relationship between protest participation and the quality 
of political institutions. 
 





















Source: LAPOP (2008). 
 
Institutions are the backbone of the policymaking process. A congress that is capable and 
knowledgeable, an independent judicial branch, a cohesive party system and a competent 
bureaucracy are prerequisites for good governance (Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2009). 
Strong institutions are usually associated with a good policy environment, while the opposite is 
true when institutions are deficient. Under weak institutions, both confidence in their 
effectiveness and reliance on their outcomes will tend to be low, prompting individuals to 
consider alternative ways of affecting politics.  


















While it is always the case that some portion of the population will feel alienated from or 
dissatisfied with decisions taken through formal institutions—no matter how well they 
function—we expect this feeling to be more widespread where weakness is an issue. In such 
cases, protest offers a channel to voice preferences in a more direct way. Through 
demonstrations, citizens can expect to directly impact decisions, prompting reversals of 
undesired policies or the adoption of desired ones, while bypassing the limitations of institutional 
channels. As argued earlier, however, this practice might serve to perpetuate a “low 
institutionalization” equilibrium with perverse effects on the prospects of institutions’ 
strengthening.   
We explore the effects of the degree of institutionalization on individuals’ propensities to 
participate in protests using data gathered by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) in 2008 for 17 countries.
18 These surveys, designed to be representative of the voting-
age population in each of the countries, cover a broad spectrum of topics ranging from 
assessments of the economic situation to respondents’ engagement in different forms of political 
participation.  Our dependent variable is respondents’ answer to a question on whether they have 
joined a demonstration or public protest during the past 12 months. 
Drawing from the international literature on protest participation, we include in the 
analysis a number of personal features found to affect the probability of joining protests and 
demonstrations. These include basic socioeconomic attributes, individual motivational attitudes, 
and individual perceptions of contextual incentives and opportunities. We are especially 
interested in individual-level perceptions and country level measures of the strength and quality 
of policymaking institutions. The first set of measures is taken from the LAPOP survey. The 
second was created based on country-level ratings of a number of government institutions as 
detailed below. 
We provide pooled regressions with country level covariates first, treating the whole 
sample together. We find support for the hypothesis that the quality of institutions is negatively 
related to the propensity to participate in protests, as well as confirmation of various pre-existing 
insights (mostly from literature on developed countries) on the determinants of participation.  A 
                                                           
18 The countries and respective number of observations are: Mexico (1,560), Guatemala (1,538), El Salvador 
(1,549), Honduras (1,522), Nicaragua (1,540), Costa Rica (1,500), Panama (1,536), Colombia (1,503), Ecuador 
(3,000), Bolivia (3,003), Peru (1,500), Paraguay (1,166), Uruguay (1,500), Brazil (1,497), Venezuela (1,500), 
Argentina (1,486), and the Dominican Republic (1,507). Chile was also surveyed, but unfortunately no question on 
protest participation was asked.   18
few of the usual suspect variables do not appear significant; these slightly more puzzling results 
become a bit more understandable once we move to country-by-country specifications. 
Some variation across countries in the signs and significance of some explanatory 
variables might be due to contextual factors in relation to the type of protests dominant in each 
country at the point in time of our cross-section, the year 2008.  For instance, the effect of 
income on the propensity to protest will be different for a country like Argentina if the 
predominant protests of the year were protests by the (mostly poor) unemployed requesting 
social programs rather than road blockades by agricultural producers (of wider socioeconomic 
range) requesting lower agricultural export taxes.
19 
Other cross-country variations in the signs and significance of some explanatory 
variables might connect more directly to our argument about institutional strength and the use of 
APTs. We explore a few of such possibilities through some interaction terms and via simulation 





The dependent variable is the following question from the LAPOP: “How often have you 
participated in protests and demonstrations in the past 12 months? Never, almost never, or 
sometimes.” For the purposes of our analysis we collapse the categories “sometimes” and 
“almost never” and work with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual participated or 
not.  
We use expert assessments of four fundamental government institutions to build our 
measures of the strength of policymaking in a given country. These are the following: Congress 
Capabilities is a measure of the effectiveness of lawmaking bodies from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (average over 2003 to 2005); the extent of Judicial Independence is 
drawn from the Fraser Institute of Economic Freedom Report (average over 1995-2003); Party 
System Institutionalization captures the extent of a stable, moderate and socially rooted party 
system to articulate and aggregate societal interests from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
2006; and Bureaucratic Quality ratings are taken from the International Country Risk Guide 
                                                           
19 We hope to explore these contextual factors when we can obtain similar data for other years.   19
(average 1984-2001).  Based on factor analysis of these four measures we created an index of 
Institutional Strength that is the focus of most of our empirical analysis.
20 
At the individual level we are interested in three features in particular. First is 
respondents’ perception of the workings of political institutions. The item that most closely 
captures this feature is one that asks how much respect respondents have for political institutions 
in their country (respect institutions). The second feature refers to the representational aspect of 
democracy. We employ an item on the extent respondents feel their interests are being 
represented by political parties (parties represent).  Lastly, we pay special attention to the 
question of whether protesters tend to have extreme ideological views. To build a measure of 
ideological extremism (extreme ideology), we recoded the left/right ideological scale such that 
the middle point was lowest and the extreme points (in either end) were highest.
21 
As controls we use a number of individual-level variables that are usually found to affect 
individuals’ decision to participate in protests. The first factor refers to individual levels of 
dissatisfaction with the current government and its policies.
22 This is captured by individuals’ 
reported intention to vote for the opposition candidate if elections were to be held soon (vote 
opponent). 
A second factor receiving increased attention in the literature is the relationship between 
individuals’ experience with corruption (corruption experience) and protest engagement. 
Previous studies have found that perceptions of public corruption increase the individual’s 
likelihood of participating in protests.  Authors such as Gingerich (2009) and Kiewiet de Jonge 
(2009) argue that corruption victimization may be a grievance that lowers the collective action 
cost of protest due to the manner in which it affects the attribution process.
23 
                                                           
20 With collaborators we have developed detailed measures of the workings of institutions in Latin American 
countries in IDB (2005), Berkman et al. (2009), and Stein and Tommasi (2007). Every feature explored was highly 
correlated with corresponding features gauged by the internationally available measures we employ here. Given that 
the latter are available for a broader sample of countries, we opted to employ these instead of the ones we developed 
for Latin American countries only, in the hope that some of this analysis might be extended in the future to a wider 
sample of countries. 
21 In every country in the sample except for the Dominican Republic, the median respondent was located at the 
middle of the scale. 
22 Anderson and Mendes (2005) explore a related issue and find that having voted for the opposition in the previous 
election is an important predictor of the propensity to participate in protests. 
23 In ongoing work (Scartascini, Tommasi, and Trucco, 2009a, and Trucco 2009) we find an additional mechanism 
by which systemic corruption might affect the decision to protest.  Those papers allow the existence of two different 
alternative political technologies, bribes and street protests, and show an equilibrium complementarity in the use of 
such technologies. “Bribes by the rich” and “protests by the poor” are likely to be countervailing forces that will 
tend to happen together in polities with weaker political institutions.  Interpreting corruption as a proxy for the   20
Other variables commonly utilized in the literature attempt to capture general political 
motivational attitudes that might make individuals more likely to participate. These include the 
intensity of political interest (political interest), the degree of (self-reported) understanding of 
politics (understand politics) and the level of trust in other people (interpersonal trust). 
Interpersonal trust is directly related to the collective nature of protests. Protests and 
demonstrations tend to be more successful the greater the number of participants. Thus the 
incentive to join such a group action is positively correlated with the extent to which an 
individual believes that other members will not defect on her. 
Finally, there is a set of socio-demographic controls. The belief that the rich and more 
educated are more likely to engage in political participation in general, and in demonstrations in 
particular, is widespread, at least in the developed-country literature (Booth and Seligson, 2008). 
On the one hand, organizing and participating in protests are costly enterprises that not everyone 
is able to afford. Thus material resources should matter. On the other, it is commonly believed 
that such forms of political participation presuppose some degree of awareness and 
understanding of the political process that the well-educated are more likely to possess. In this 
view, the better educated are seen as better informed, more critical and more engaged 
individuals. We control for age (a continuous variable), gender (a dummy variable where 1 






As is clear from the previous discussion, we believe protest is associated with a number of 
factors. Furthermore, we suggested that not only some of these factors might affect protest 
participation differently in different countries, but also that certain country characteristics might 
be associated with the likelihood of protest participation both directly and through their 
relationships with individual-level covariates. Given the complexity of these relationships, and in 
order to better understand the multilevel structure of the data, we perform several exercises.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extensive use of bribes in politics, we predict a connection between corruption and protest.  (An individual’s 
experience with corruption is a very significant predictor of her beliefs regarding country corruption, as discussed in 
Scartascini, 2008). 
24 Income was made comparable following Gasparini et. al (2008), where local currencies were converted into PPP 
dollars of 2007.   21
We begin exploring these relationships by running simple regressions containing the 
country level covariates—our index and each of its components. A rich debate currently exists 
on the best strategy to analyze multiple country survey data, given that panel data methods were 
found to be inappropriate.
25  Following the discussion in Gelman and Hill (2006) and results in 
Leoni (2006) we estimate these first regressions in two ways. First we run a pooled specification, 
using the jackknife procedure clustering by country to calculate the standard errors. We run a 
logit specification given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, as follows: 
 
Pr(y j[i] = 1) = logit 
-1 (α + Xj[i]β1 + Ujβ2),      for i = 1,…,nj and j = 1,…,17 
 
where  i indexes individuals, j[i] means individual i  belongs to country j,  y  j[i] = 1 means 
individual i reported participation in protest in the past 12 months, X is a matrix containing all 
individual level covariates and U is a matrix containing the country level covariates. nj is the 
number of individuals in country j. 
This specification relies, however, on assumptions that might be too strong. First, we are 
assuming that all country level variation is explained by our aggregate measures. Second, unless 
the individual-level variables are interacted with the aggregate measures they are assumed to be 
fixed across countries. To relax these assumptions somewhat, and as a robustness check, we also 
run a semi-pooling specification where we allow for random country intercepts, as follows: 
 
 Pr(y  j[i] = 1) = logit 
-1 (αj  + Xj[i]β1 + Ujβ2),      for i = 1,…,nj and j = 1,…,17 
αj ~ N(μα, σα
2), for j = 1,…,17   
 
In the next step we estimate regressions by country to explore possible variations in the 
estimated effects of individual-level characteristics on the likelihood of protesting. Following the 
estimation of these 17 regressions, we look at simple correlations between the estimated 
coefficients (on individual characteristics) and the institutional features of the countries. This 
provides us with preliminary evidence on the degree to which country characteristics explain the 
fact that respondents with the same individual traits have different propensities to protest.  
Based on these results we specify the full model, which includes both the country-level 
covariates and their interaction with the individual level variables of interest. This model is also 
                                                           
25 See a 2005 special edition of Political Analysis on multilevel analysis of large-cluster survey data.   22
run based on both specifications discussed above: one pooled with clustered jack-knife standard 
errors and one semi-pooled with random country intercepts.
26 
 
3.3 Cross-Country Regressions on Institutional Strength 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the random intercepts logit estimations including country level 
covariates. We obtained very similar results using the pooled specification with clustered jack-
knife standard errors, which we omit due to space limitations.  Except for ratings of the quality 
of the bureaucracy, all proxies of the functioning of institutions have a negative and significant 
estimated effect on the likelihood of protest participation. That is, in countries where these 
institutions work better the propensity of individuals to take to the streets is significantly lower.  
 
                                                           
26 Ideally we would have fit a full hierarchical model allowing for both random intercepts and slopes. However, 
these specifications are computationally complex and in most cases the maximum likelihood estimator does not 
converge.   23
Table 1. Pooled Random Intercepts Logit Estimation Results 
 









Institutional Stregth Index -0.398***
(0.126)
Respect Institutions -0.032** -0.031** -0.032** -0.032** -0.031**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parties Represent 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Experience with Corruption 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.276***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Interpersonal Trust 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Vote for Opponent 0.284*** 0.281*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.281***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Extreme Ideology 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Interest in Politics 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.403***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Understand Politics 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.111** 0.110** 0.111** 0.111** 0.110**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Education 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Income) 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -2.506*** -3.530*** -2.961*** -3.821*** -3.536***
(0.611) (0.284) (0.596) (0.466) (0.281)
Observations 13968 13968 13968 13968 13968
R-squared .....
Number of countries 17 17 17 17 17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
Regarding individual motivational attitudes, except for the self-declared understanding of 
politics, the estimated effects are positive and significant, corroborating the claims usually found 
in the literature. With respect to socio-economic controls, while the more educated and males 
appear more likely to protest, income and age fail to attain statistical significance.    24
Moving on to two variables of particular interest to us, ideological extremism is estimated 
to have a positive and significant effect on the propensity to engage in protest. Whether or not 
parties are perceived to fulfill their representative duties, however, turns out to be insignificant.  
Constraining the estimated effects to be the same across countries can conceal important cross-
sectional variations. This is what we turn to next. As we will see, there can be significant 
variations that appear to be in part explained by the functioning of institutions themselves.   
 
3.4 Country-by-Country Specifications 
 
Results from the individual country estimates are displayed in Figure 3. The usual controls 
capturing individuals’ propensity to participate tend indeed to have a positive and significant 
effect on the likelihood of protest participation. The results on socio-economic variables are less 
straightforward. While education tends to have a positive effect, income, gender and age display 
very different estimated effects depending on the country. In Panama and Peru, for example, it 
seems like the poorer were more likely to report protest participation, while the opposite is true 
in Venezuela and Uruguay. 
   25
Figure 3. Country-by-Country Regression Results 
 
Notes: Each column corresponds to one of the seventeen countries, which are labeled on the x axis. Each row reports 
the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients on each of the independent variables.  The threshold used to 
establish the significance of the estimated coefficients was a z score of 1.69 or more, corresponding to a 90% 
confidence interval around the estimate not including zero. 
 
 
With respect to the belief that parties represent their constituencies’ interests, we observe 
contrasting effects across countries. In some the effect is positive and significant, in others it is 
not significant and still in another it is negative and significant. Based on the accounts of party 
involvement in protests discussed in the previous section these results are not surprising. Nor is 
the fact that this variation can be in part accounted for by the quality of institutions. As shown in 
Figure 4(a)., in countries where institutions are of good quality, those believing that parties 
represent their constituencies are less likely to protest. As suggested earlier, with a well-
functioning institutional setting, parties are able to fulfill their primary role as representatives 
through conventional political institutions. When institutions are weaker, however, the best way 
for parties to represent their constituencies’ interests might indeed be to voice them through   26
unconventional means. Under these circumstances, though, the performance ratings of parties 
tend to be lower among non-protesters than among those who engage in protest.  
 
Figure 4. The Relationship between Estimated Coefficients 
by Country and Institutional Strength 
































































































































           (a)                   (b) 
  
Notes: Points in the figure represent the estimated coefficients and bars represent ± the estimated standard error. 
The gray line is the fitted line of a simple bivariate ordinary least squares regression of the estimated coefficients 
on the institutional strength index. 
 
 
Based on the results in Figure 4(b)., ideology is an important factor on the decision to 
protest in many countries. In these countries, individuals placing themselves further away from 
the median ideological position tend to display higher probability of protest participation. In 
other countries, however, the ideological distinction does not seem to play a significant role. If 
our conjectures are correct, extreme ideological inclinations would play a role in countries with a 
better institutional environment, but not so much where institutions are weak. Under the latter 
conditions, discontent would tend to be more widespread, downplaying the role of ideological 
divisions. 
While interesting, these results should nonetheless be taken with a grain of salt, since we 
are not correcting for the fact that the dependent variable in these exercises—that is, the   27
estimated coefficients by country—is estimated. We now move on to consider specifications 




3.5 Full Specification: Country-level Covariates and Interactions 
 
Results on the pooled (clustered jackknife standard errors) and semi-pooled (random intercepts) 
estimations are presented in Table 2. In general, the results obtained in the previous exercise 
continue to hold under the full specification. Most of individuals’ motivational attitudes turn out 
significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of protest participation.  Thus 
respondents with higher interest in politics, more trust in people and who would vote for the 
opposition are more likely to have reported protest participation. Regarding socio-economic 
characteristics, higher levels of education and being a male appear associated with higher 
probability of participation.  
 
                                                           
27 It would be possible to estimate a two-stage regression where on the second stage the individual level coefficients 
are regressed on the aggregate level covariates. Hanushek (1974), Borjas (1982) and Lewis and Linzer (2005) have 
all proposed weighting schemes to address the heteroskedasticity resulting from the fact that the dependent variable 
in the second stage is estimated. We chose, however, not to implement the two-step approach for two reasons. First, 
we have a relatively small sample of countries, limiting the degrees of freedom available for the second stage 
estimation.  Second, these models are very cumbersome to interpret. 
   28




Institutional Stregth Index -0.430* -0.328**
(0.233) (0.151)
Respect Institutions -0.029 -0.032**
(0.020) (0.014)
Parties Represent 0.103** 0.095***
(0.047) (0.029)
Institutions*Parties Represent -0.061 -0.059***
(0.037) (0.018)
Experience with Corruption 0.319*** 0.278***
(0.045) (0.037)
Interpersonal Trust 0.159** 0.142***
(0.057) (0.030)
Vote for Opponent 0.192 0.281***
(0.111) (0.059)
Extreme Ideology -0.062 0.004
(0.062) (0.031)
Institutions*Extreme Ideology 0.074 0.051***
(0.050) (0.020)
Interest in Politics 0.374*** 0.405***
(0.040) (0.028)














Number of countries 17 17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




The additional control on personal experience of corruption also comes out as positive 
and significantly related to protest participation. As expected, those who report higher levels of 
respect for institutions are less likely to engage in demonstrations, while those who report low 
levels are more likely to do so. 
In the group of variables that is of main interest to us, we see that the relationships 
uncovered through casual exploration in the previous section continue to hold. While the 
estimated coefficient on whether a respondent believes parties represent their constituencies’   29
interests is positive, this effect is dampened as institutional strength increases (negative sign of 
the interaction term). The opposite holds with respondents holding more extreme ideological 
views. As institutional strength increases, so does the effect of holding extreme views on the 
propensity to protest. 
While the results in Table 2 provide us with information on the sign and significance of 
the coefficients of interest, their scope and actual effects are difficult to grasp just by looking at 
these numbers. The non-linearity of the specification and the use of interaction terms complicate 
their interpretation. For clarity of exposition we will discuss the results through the use of 
predicted probabilities calculated for meaningful profiles of individuals. We perform these 
calculations based on the random intercepts specification. 
Given the homogeneity of results with respect to personal motivational attitudes, we set 
the individual profiles in the exercises that follow to one corresponding to a “highly motivated 
individual” while letting the variables of interest vary. A highly motivated individual is one who 
is interested in politics (value set at 3 on a 1-4 scale), would vote for the opponent if elections 
were to be held soon (dummy set to 1), trusts people (set to 3 on a 1-4 scale), and displays a 
(self-reported) high degree of understanding of the main issues in politics (set to 5 on a 1-7 
scale). Since experience with corruption and levels of respect for institutions also turned out to 
be uniformly relevant in all countries, we set these variables to their sample mean values. The 
same is done with the socio economic characteristics: education (set to 9 years), income (US 
$164 PPP) and age (set to 30 years old). It is worth noting that we replicated the exercises shown 
below with average motivational attitudes and found very similar results.  
The objective here is to explore how these motivated individuals are led to take actual 
part in protest depending on their ideological stance, their sense of being represented, and the 
quality of formal institutions in their countries.   
 
3.6. Parties and their Constituencies: Institutions or the Streets? 
 
While we uncover evidence of a direct effect of institutional strength on the propensity to protest, 
results also suggest it might affect parties’ strategies.  That is, the same logic leading individuals 
to circumvent weak institutions and take to the streets seems to hold for parties as well. We 
investigate these dynamics with the help of Figure 5.   30
Figure 5. The Effect of Believing Parties Represent Constituencies Well 



































































































Notes: Vertical bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Triangles represent the profile of an 
individual who agrees with the statement that parties represent constituents well (answer category 6). 
Circles represent the profile of an individual who disagrees (answer category 1) with the statement.  
 
In that figure we compute the predicted probabilities of two profiles of individuals. The 
first corresponds to an individual who agrees that parties represent constituencies well; we set 
this item to the value of 6. The second represents an individual who believes the opposite; we set 
the answer to 1. All other variables are assigned the values specified earlier. Additionally, we 
compare these two profiles of individuals at varying levels of our institutional strength index. 
The panel on the left displays, for each value of the institutional strength index, the pair of 
predicted probabilities corresponding to the individual who agrees and to the individual who 
disagrees with the party statement. On the panel on the right, we plot the differences between 
these pairs of predicted probabilities with their standard errors in order to know in which cases 
they are significantly different. 
Regarding the direct effect of the institutional strength index, it is particularly strong in 
the case of individuals who rate parties as doing a good job representing their interests. This 
individual has an estimated probability of engaging in protest of around 37 percent if he lives in 
a country with weak institutions. The same individual in a country with stronger institutions has   31
an estimated probability of protesting that falls well below 10 percent. We also observe a drop, 
though less abrupt, in the case of individuals who are more dissatisfied with parties. Those 
believing parties do not represent constituencies well have an estimated likelihood of engaging in 
protest of around 30 percent under weak institutions and of 12 percent under better institutions. 
Inspection of the data shows that the number of respondents agreeing with the statement 
about parties is much lower under low quality institutions than under higher quality ones. Thus it 
seems that as institutions improve, so does the ability of parties to convey a sense of truly 
representing the interests of their constituencies. Conceivably, in low institutional settings it is 
harder for parties to perform this duty through the conventional arenas. Under such 
circumstances, parties are probably better able to defend their constituencies’ interests directly 
through the streets. As institutions improve, parties convey a better sense of representation, 
reducing people’s—and parties’—incentives to protest. 
 
3.7. Ideological Extremism and the Tendency to Protest 
 
In previous studies it has been argued that ideological extremists are more likely to participate in 
protests. We explore that question in our Latin American sample and find that the answer is a 
conditional yes. Ideological extremists are significantly more likely to protest than the rest of 
citizens in countries with strong institutions.  The difference is not significant in countries with 
weak institutions, however.  These results are displayed in Figure 6, which was built following 
the same procedure as the previous figure. 
   32
Figure 6. The Effect of Extreme Ideological Inclination 






































































































Notes: Vertical bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Triangles represent the profile of an 
individual who holds an extreme ideological position (answer category 4). Circles represent the profile 
of an individual who holds a moderate ideological position (answer category 1). 
 
 
As before, we observe an important direct effect of institutional strength. The predicted 
probabilities of protest participation for both profiles of respondents (extreme and moderate, both 
highly motivated, all else at the mean) decline considerably as institutional quality improves. 
Both profiles start at similarly high levels (around 35 percent) under low institutional strength. 
As they improve the estimated probabilities fall to between 13 percent and 8 percent.  
Interestingly, the predicted probabilities of participation by an individual holding an 
extreme ideological position declines less than that of a moderate respondent. The differences 
between the two sets of predicted probabilities are statistically significant beginning at relatively 
mid to low levels of institutional quality. That is, at lower ratings of institutional strength, we are 
not able to differentiate between extremists and moderates on their propensity to participate in 
demonstrations. At better ratings, however, the difference becomes increasingly important, with 
the more extremist being more likely to take to the streets. 
This pattern is compatible with our proposed account. That is, that under low quality 
institutions the policy environment will be of lower quality, fostering more widespread 
discontent. Even those holding more moderate ideological inclinations will likely be dissatisfied. 
As the quality of institutions improves, ideological considerations dominate.    33
4.  Conclusion 
 
Different features of political institutions have been used to explain political and policy 
outcomes. Most of this literature relies on the proper functioning of institutions, assuming that all 
outcomes are produced in a fully institutionalized manner. While countries at distinct stages of 
development might share political processes characterized by very similar rules and procedures, 
their actual functioning might differ considerably.  
In this paper we explore the consequences of this fundamental contrast, in particular how 
it affects individuals; choices of channels of political participation. We argued that when 
institutions function well, actors are more likely to participate through institutionalized arenas, 
whereas when they are weak more direct channels of participation might be chosen.  
We explored this relationship empirically with a particular focus on one prominent type 
of direct participation: street protests. We thus combined country-level measures of institutional 
strength with individual-level information on protest participation in 17 Latin American 
countries. Our results suggest that institutional strength is indeed associated with lower protest 
participation by individuals. We also uncovered interesting interactions between individual 
features and institutional quality.  
Respondents holding extremist ideological stances were more likely to report protest 
participation where institutions are of higher quality. However, both extremists and moderates 
displayed similar propensities to protest in countries where institutions are weaker.   
Furthermore, we find that those who believe that political parties represent their 
constituencies well are less likely to participate in protest in countries where institutions are 
relatively strong; in contrast, in countries with weak institutions, those (few) who believe that 
parties represent their constituencies well are more likely to engage in protests. We interpret this 
result as an indication that, just like individuals, parties also choose between the more 
institutionalized versus the more direct channels in representing the interests of their 
constituencies.  
Where political actors are more likely to “play by the book,” bargaining and decision-
making will be fairly institutionalized. This, in turn, generates incentives for individuals to invest 
in the strengthening of these institutions and also in their capacities to affect decisions from 
within them. If, on the other hand, most actors believe the best way to affect decisions is through 
alternative means such as protests, the incentives to develop strong and well-functioning   34
institutions will be much lower. Given this feedback effect, investing in the proper functioning of 
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Appendix: Description of Variables Employed 
 
Institutional Strength Index: this measure is scaled to the interval 0 – low quality – and 3.5 – 
high quality. It was computed based on factor analysis of four indicators: 
 
•  Effectiveness of lawmaking bodies (1= very ineffective to 7 = very effective) from the 
GCR (average over 2003 to 2005); 
•  Fraser Index of independence of the judiciary (average over 1995 to 2003); 
•  Party system rating from the BTI (2006) – To what extent is there a stable, moderate and 
socially rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests? Ranked from 1 
to 7, higher numbers indicating higher levels of a stable party system. 
•  International Country Risk Guide “Bureaucracy Quality” rating (average over 1984 to 
2001). High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous 




Extreme: this measure is scaled to the interval 1 (– moderate ideological position – to 5 – 
extreme ideological position. 
 
Parties represent voters: “To what extent political parties represent their voters well? 1- not at all, 
5- to a great extent” 
 
Respect institutions: “To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?” 1 – 
not at all, 7 – a lot. 
 
Political interest: “How interested are you in politics? 1- a lot, 2- somewhat, 3- a little, 4- not at 
all.” We reverse the scale of this variable for estimation. 
 
Understand politics: “I feel I have a good understanding of the most important political issues in 
this country. 1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree.” 
 
Interpersonal trust: “How much do you trust people you meet for the first time? 1- trust 
completely, 2- trust somewhat, 3- trust a little, 4- don’t trust at all.” We reverse the scale of this 
variable for estimation. 
 
Would vote for opponent: “If presidential elections were to be held this weekend who would you 
vote for? 1- would not vote, 2- would vote for the incumbent, 3- would vote for the challenger, 
4- would vote blank.” This variable was employed as dummies for each category setting the 
second as a baseline (not included in the specification) 
 
Corruption experience: In this index we add the number of reported times a respondent was 
asked to pay a bribe by either a public servant, a police officer or to keep services like electricity 
going.   36
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